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Abstract—In this paper, we present a coding-theoretic frame-
work for message transmission over packet-switched networks.
Network is modeled as a channel which can induce packet errors,
deletions, insertions, and out of order delivery of packets. The
proposed approach can be viewed as an extension of the one
introduced by Ko¨tter and Kschischang for networks based on
random linear network coding. Namely, while their framework
is based on subspace codes and designed for networks in which
network nodes perform random linear combining of the packets,
ours is based on the so-called subset codes, and is designed for
networks employing routing in network nodes.
Index Terms—Subset codes, packet networks, routing, permu-
tation channel, packet erasure codes, forward error correction.
I. INTRODUCTION
PACKET-SWITCHED networks that employ routing as ameans for transmitting packets between pairs of users are
in widespread use in communications today [1]. We formulate
here a framework for end-to-end forward error correction
in such networks. We are motivated by the work of Ko¨tter
and Kschischang [2] in which the authors define so-called
subspace codes and show that these codes, and particularly
their constant-dimension versions, are adequate constructions
for error and erasure recovery in networks employing random
linear network coding (RLNC). The two frameworks turn
out to be similar in many respects. Indeed, most concepts
defined in our model have natural analogs in the subspace
coding setting. On the other hand, there are some important
differences between the two models, one of which will lead
to a surprising conclusion that the codes for packet networks
that are introduced here are equivalent (in a certain sense) to
the classical binary codes in the Hamming space.
Let us now informally state the basic idea behind both ap-
proaches. Consider a network, abstracted as a communication
channel, that acts on the transmitted packets by some ran-
domized transformation (not including errors, erasures, etc.).
In the case of RLNC networks, the channel transformation
represents random linear combining of the source packets.
In the case of networks based on routing, the transformation
corresponds to permuting the packets in an unpredictable, and
essentially random way. Namely, in such networks the packets
with the same destination are frequently sent over different
routes in the network and, as a consequence, they are received
in practically arbitrary order (see the following section for
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a more detailed discussion of the channel model). The idea
of sending information through such channels is very simple:
Encode the information in an object that is invariant under the
given transformation. This has led Ko¨tter and Kschischang
to the abstraction of the channel corresponding to RLNC
networks (the operator channel) and the definition of codes
for such a channel. In this case, the object invariant under
random linear combinations of the packets is the vector space
spanned by those packets1. Hence, the “codewords” are in this
context taken to be subspaces of some ambient vector space
[2].
In the case under consideration here, namely routed packet
networks, we need an object that is invariant under random
permutations of the packets. Such an object is a set. Therefore,
a natural idea is to consider sets of packets as “codewords”
in this context. If S is the set of all possible packets, the
appropriate space in which such codes are to be defined is the
set of all subsets of S, denoted P(S). In the following, we
provide precise definitions and properties of the codes in P(S),
which are proposed as relevant to the problem of reliable data
transmission over routed packet networks.
II. THE SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a packet-switched network in which a source
node wishes to communicate with a destination node (or with
multiple destination nodes). We assume that a message to
be sent consists of a batch of packets (also called a gener-
ation) that are “simultaneously” injected into the network.
Due to varying topology and load, the packets from the
same batch can be sent over different routes in the network
and their order is in general not preserved at the receiving
side. This is especially true for, e.g., mobile ad-hoc networks
where the topology is rapidly changing, and heavily loaded
datagram-based networks in which the packets are frequently
redirected in order to balance the load over different parts
of the network. Hence, we will model networks as packet
permutation channels which can deliver injected packets in
an arbitrary order at the destination. Apart from permutations,
there are various other unwanted effects the network can
impose on the transmitted packets. We consider here three
of them: errors, deletions, and insertions. Errors are random
alterations of packet symbols caused by noise, malfunctioning
of network equipment, etc. Packet deletions correspond to the
fact that some packets can be “lost” in the channel, in which
case the receiver is unaware of them being sent2. They can
occur for many reasons, finite buffering capabilities of routers,
1 Strictly speaking, it is invariant only with high probability – if the
transformation is full-rank.
2 In the networking literature, the term “erasures” is also used in this
context. We will use the term “deletions” since it is more appropriate from
the coding theory viewpoint.
2router/link failures, etc. Finally, packet insertions are a form of
malicious behavior, where some user imitates the true source
of the data, and wants the receiver to misinterpret the data.
In the following section we will introduce subset codes
as adequate for the above-described network model, i.e., for
the permutation channel with errors, deletions, and insertions.
Given that these codes are, as already noted, defined on the
power set of the set of all possible packets S, we can also
give a more formal definition of the considered channel: It is a
discrete memoryless channel with input and output alphabets
equal to P(S). The channel is completely described by its
transition probabilities (the probabilities of mapping the input
subset X to the output subset Y , for all X,Y ∈ P(S)) which,
on the other hand, are determined by the joint statistics of
errors, deletions, and insertions of the elements of S.
As a final remark in this section, we emphasize that this
paper considers an end-to-end network transmission model.
Hence, it is implicitly assumed that (subset) coding is done
on the transport or application layer.
III. CODES FOR PACKET NETWORKS
A. Power sets and subset codes
Let S be a nonempty finite set, and let P(S) denote the
power set of S, i.e., the set of all subsets of S. A natural
metric associated with this space is:
d(X,Y ) = |X △ Y | (1)
for X,Y ∈ P(S), where △ denotes the symmetric difference
of sets. It can also be written as d(X,Y ) = |X∪Y |−|X∩Y | =
|X |+ |Y | − 2|X ∩ Y | = 2|X ∪ Y | − |X | − |Y |. This distance
is the length of the shortest path between X and Y in the
Hasse diagram [4] of the lattice of subsets of S ordered by
inclusion. It is analogous to the subspace metric defined in [2].
This diagram plays a role similar to the Hamming hypercube
for the classical codes in the Hamming metric (actually, it
is isomorphic to the Hamming hypercube, see Section IV).
Another useful metric is given by:
d′(X,Y ) = max{|X \ Y |, |Y \X |}. (2)
It can also be written as d′(X,Y ) = max{|X |, |Y |} − |X ∩
Y | = |X ∪ Y | − min{|X |, |Y |}, and it is analogous to
the injection metric for subspace codes [5]. Direct proofs
that d and d′ are indeed metrics are easy and very similar
to the proofs for subspace and injection metrics, and we
shall therefore omit them. In the following, we will only use
distance d and refer to it as the subset metric.
One can define codes in the space P(S) in the usual way.
Namely, a subset code C is simply a nonempty subset of P(S).
Important parameters of such a code are its cardinality, |C|,
minimum distance:
min
X,Y ∈C, X 6=Y
d(X,Y ), (3)
maximum cardinality of the codewords:
max
X∈C
|X |, (4)
and the cardinality of the ambient set, |S|. If C ⊆ P(S) has
minimum distance d, and every codeword is of cardinality at
most ℓ, we say that it is a code of type [log |S|, log |C|, d; ℓ] (the
base of the logarithm is generally arbitrary; we will assume
that it is 2, and hence that the lengths of the messages are
measured in bits). If all codewords of C are of cardinality
ℓ, we say that it is a constant-cardinality code. A significant
advantage of constant-cardinality codes is that the receiver
knows in advance how many packets it needs to receive in
order to initiate decoding, similarly to the constant-dimension
codes in projective spaces [2]. The rate of an [n, k, d; ℓ] code
is defined by:
R =
k
nℓ
. (5)
In the intended application of subset codes, S will be the
set of all possible packets, n = log |S| the length of each
packet, and ℓ the number of packets one codeword contains.
The source maps information sequence of length k bits to a
codeword which is a set consisting of ℓ packets of length n
bits each, and sends these ℓ packets through a channel. In
the channel, these packets are permuted, some of them are
deleted, some of them are received erroneously, and possibly
some new packets are inserted by a malicious user. The
receiver collects all these packets and attempts to reconstruct
the codeword which was sent, i.e., the information sequence
which corresponds to this codeword.
We next prove a simple, but basic fact about the correcting
capabilities of subset codes.
Theorem 1: Assume that a code C of type [n, k, d; ℓ] is used
for transmitting packets over a network. Then any pattern of
t errors, ρ deletions, and s insertions can be corrected by the
minimum distance decoder (with respect to the subset metric),
as long as 2(ρ+ 2t+ s) < d.
Proof: Let X ∈ C be the set/codeword which is trans-
mitted through a channel. Let Y be the received set. If ρ
packets from X have been deleted, and s new packets have
been inserted, then we easily deduce that |X ∩ Y | ≥ |X | − ρ
and |Y | ≤ |X | − ρ + s. Observe further that errors can be
regarded as combinations of deletions and insertions. Namely,
an erroneous packet can be thought of as being inserted,
while the original packet has been deleted. Therefore, the
actual number of deletions and insertions is ρ + t and s + t,
respectively. We therefore conclude that |X∩Y | ≥ |X |−ρ−t
and |Y | ≤ |X | − ρ+ s, and so
d(X,Y ) = |X |+ |Y | − 2|X ∩ Y | ≤ ρ+ 2t+ s. (6)
Now, if 2(ρ+ 2t+ s) < d, then d(X,Y ) ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋ and hence
X can be recovered from Y .
If only deletions can occur in the channel, we will have
d(X,Y ) = ρ and a sufficient condition for unique decodability
will be ρ ≤ ⌊d−12 ⌋.
As Theorem 1 establishes, large enough minimum distance
d ensures that the sent codeword can be recovered for a
certain level of channel impairments. Therefore, this parameter
is determined by the channel statistics, i.e., probabilities of
packet error/deletion/insertion, and packet delivery require-
ments (e.g., error probability). Other code parameters, ℓ and
n, are also determined by certain delivery requirements, such
as delay, and by the properties of the network, such as the
maximal packet length. A general method for the construction
3of subset codes with specified parameters, which reduces to
the construction of binary codes, is described in Section IV.
Another simple method, via packet-level block codes and
sequence numbers, is illustrated in the following subsection.
B. Examples of subset codes
In this subsection, we give a simple example of subset codes
to illustrate the above definitions.
How does one encode information in a set? One possible
solution (which is widely used in practice) is to add a sequence
number to every packet sent, thus achieving resilience to
arbitrary permutations. To illustrate this, assume that the
source has two packets to send, p0 and p1. Note that, from
the point of view of the receiver, the sequence (p0, p1) is not
the same as the sequence (p1, p0); these two sequences carry
different information. In the permutation channel, however,
either of these two sequences can be received when (p0, p1)
is sent. The sender therefore sends (q0, q1) instead, where
qi = (i, pi) is the new packet formed by prepending a
sequence number to the packet pi. Note that sequences (q0, q1)
and (q1, q0) are now identical to the receiver because in both
cases it will extract (p0, p1) and further process these packets.
This means that the carrier of information is actually a set
{q0, q1} = {(0, p0), (1, p1)}. This approach, combined with
some classical packet-level error-correcting code, provides an
example of subset codes that we describe next.
Let A be the set of all packets the source can possibly send.
Assume that |A| = 2m, so that we can think of information
packets as having m bits. Assume further that the source
wishes to send k such packets, p0, . . . , pk−1 to a destination
over a network, i.e., over a permutation channel with errors,
deletions, and insertions. To protect the packets the source
defines some packet-level block code (see, e.g., [6]), and uses
the corresponding encoder to map these k packets to ℓ > k
packets, q0, . . . , qℓ−1. To cope with the permutations in the
channel, the source further adds a sequence number of length
log2 ℓ bits3 to every packet qi. This gives a subset code of
type [m + log2 ℓ, km, d; ℓ], where d is its minimum distance
whose concrete value is irrelevant for this example. In words,
the length of the packets is m + log2 ℓ bits, there are 2km
possible information sequences (and hence the same number
of codewords), and each codeword consists of ℓ packets. The
rate of the code is therefore R = km
ℓ(m+log
2
ℓ) .
To further clarify the above arguments, assume that the
Reed-Solomon (RS) code is used as a packet-level block code
in the above scenario. Namely, the message to be sent (k
packets, p0, . . . , pk−1, of length m bits each) is being regarded
as a polynomial of degree at most k − 1 over F2m :
u(z) =
∑k−1
i=0
piz
i. (7)
The codeword represents the sequence of evaluations of
this polynomial in ℓ fixed different points in F2m . De-
note these points by α0, . . . , αℓ−1, so that the codeword is
u(α0), . . . , u(αℓ−1). The resulting code has minimum (Ham-
ming) distance ℓ − k + 1 [7]. Now, u(αi)’s are being treated
3 For notational simplicity we disregard the fact that the actual length is
⌈log
2
ℓ⌉.
as packets (these are the qi’s from the previous paragraph),
and each packet is being added a sequence number i (index
of the point of evaluation of the message polynomial). As
already explained, these sequence numbers enable the receiver
to recover from permutations, but also from deletions and
insertions because it can keep track of evaluation points. Fi-
nally, the codeword corresponding to the information sequence
(p0, . . . , pk−1) is a set U = {(i, u(αi)) : i = 0, . . . , ℓ− 1}.
Since two polynomials u and v of degree k − 1 can agree
on at most k − 1 different points, we conclude that |U ∩
V | ≤ k − 1 and therefore d(U, V ) ≥ 2(ℓ− k + 1). Thus,
we have defined a constant-cardinality subset code of type
[m+ log2 ℓ, km, 2(ℓ− k + 1); ℓ], and rate:
R =
km
ℓ (m+ log2 ℓ)
. (8)
This code is a subset analog of the Ko¨tter-Kschischang sub-
space code [2] designed for RLNC networks.
Even though RS codes are maximum distance separable
[7], the subset codes obtained in this way are not. Namely,
adding a sequence number is not an optimal way of encoding
information in a set (though this suboptimality is not a
concern in practice for sufficiently large packet lengths m,
because sequence numbers only take a couple of bytes in the
packet header). The other reason for non-optimality is that
these codes are constant-cardinality codes; larger codes can
be obtained if one allows codewords of different cardinality.
This is analogous to the relation of general subspace codes
in projective spaces and constant-dimension codes [8]. In the
following section we discuss how one can construct optimal
(in any sense) subset codes.
As a final note here we point out that the codes constructed
in this way (via packet-level block codes and sequence num-
bers) are, to the best of our knowledge, the only type of error-
correcting codes for the permutation channel described in the
literature (see, for example, the construction of the “outer”
code in [3]). As established above, they are in fact only a
special case of subset codes.
IV. SUBSET CODES AS BINARY CODES
Let S be a nonempty finite set with some implied ordering
of its elements, and observe the space {0, 1}|S| of all binary se-
quences of length |S| (denoted also 2S). Each binary sequence
x ∈ 2S defines a subset X ⊆ S containing elements defined
by the positions of ones in x. As is well-known, this mapping
of subsets to binary sequences is an isomorphism between
groups (P(S),△) and
(
2S ,⊕
)
, where ⊕ denotes the XOR
operation (addition modulo 2). Furthermore, it is easy to show
that the Hamming distance between two sequences x,y ∈ 2S
is precisely the subset distance between the corresponding
subsets X,Y ⊆ S:
dH(x,y) = wH(x⊕ y) = |X △ Y | = d(X,Y ), (9)
where wH denotes the Hamming weight of a sequence. In other
words, this mapping is also an isometry between metric spaces
(P(S), d) and
(
2S , dH
)
. This means that the subset codes in
fact represent only another way to look at classical codes in
the binary Hamming space, and vice versa. In other words, the
4study of subset codes and their properties reduces to the well-
known theory of binary codes. Constant-cardinality codes are
then equivalent to constant-weight binary codes. Finally, we
note that the classical binary codes corresponding to [n, k, d; ℓ]
subset codes have parameters (2n, k, d).
The above reasoning, though quite elementary, has an
important implication. It shows that classical codes developed
for binary channels (such as the Binary Symmetric Channel)
define in a very natural way codes for correcting errors,
deletions, and insertions in networks. Consequently, many
familiar constructions of binary codes can be applied to subset
codes. Namely, once the code parameters are determined from
the given channel statistics and packet delivery requirements,
the subset code with these parameters can be constructed
via the corresponding binary code. For example, a constant-
cardinality [n, k, d; ℓ] code could be designed as a constant-
weight binary code with codeword weights ℓ and parameters
(2n, k, d), as explained above.
The following toy example illustrates the above notions.
Example 1: Let S = {a, b, c, d}. Any subset of S can
be identified by a binary sequence of length 4; for exam-
ple {a, b} ↔ 1100, {b, d} ↔ 0101, etc. Consider now
some code in {0, 1}4, e.g., C = {1100, 1010, 0110, 0011}.
The subset counterpart of this code is then CS =
{{a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {c, d}}. The distance between two sub-
sets of S is the Hamming distance between the corresponding
binary sequences, for example:
d ({a, b}, {a, c}) = |{b, c}| = 2 = dH(1100, 1010) (10)
so that all properties of C directly translate into equivalent
properties of the subset code CS. The code CS is a constant-
cardinality code of type [2, 2, 2; 2].
The above example can be extended to arbitrary sets S and
binary codes C ⊆ 2S .
V. SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this section, we give some comments on subset codes and
the channel model that could be relevant for their analysis in
practical scenarios.
Comments on binary codes: One constraint on the binary
codes corresponding to [n, k, d; ℓ] subset codes should be
pointed out. Namely, “practical” subset codes will certainly
require that ℓ ≪ 2n, i.e., that the number of packets in
one codeword is much smaller than the number of all pos-
sible packets. This means that binary codes corresponding to
(practically feasible) subset codes will only have small weight
codewords. Moreover, the fact that binary codes corresponding
to [n, k, d; ℓ] subset codes have exponential length (2n) places
additional complexity constraints on the code design.
Comments on the channel model: The links in networks can
generally be unreliable. For example, if a large packet is sent
over a wireless link, it is highly probable that it will be hit by
an error, i.e., that at least one of its bits/symbols will be re-
ceived incorrectly. Furthermore, this error probability increases
with the packet length n. In such a scenario it can happen (with
fairly high probability) that all of the packets from the sent
codeword are erroneous, in which case X∩Y = ∅ and reliable
recovery is impossible. Subset codes alone do not provide a
good protection from errors in such cases. One way to solve
this problem is to additionally protect each packet with its
own error correcting code. This solution is in agreement with
current networking practice. Namely, as already noted, we
treat here an end-to-end network model and hence assume
that (subset) coding is done on the transport or application
layer. In most networks, packets on lower layers (e.g., link and
physical layer) include some error correcting/error detecting
codes (such as LDPC codes for error correction combined with
CRC codes for error detection). These codes effectively create
a channel that we treat here, namely, they keep the link-layer
packet error probability at a “reasonable” level.
Packet insertions also deserve a comment regarding possible
practical applications of subset codes. In general, by inserting
enough packets an adversary can always prevent the receiver
from correctly decoding the received set. Thus we also assume
in our model that the number of insertions is relatively
small, or at least that it behaves as a random variable whose
parameters we can estimate and then design the code with
respect to this estimated channel statistics. This may not be
the case in practice because insertions inherently represent
deliberate interference, but our assumption can certainly be
achieved by a proper authentication protocol; that way the
receiver will recognize and disregard (most of) the inserted
packets. That is to say that subset codes do not provide any
cryptographic protection; insertions are treated here because
they naturally fit in the model, along with deletions and errors.
We note that the above comments on errors and insertions
are also valid for subspace codes in network coded networks.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a different view on the problem of
forward error correction in the packet permutation channels.
One advantage of the presented approach is that it unifies to
some extent coding for RLNC networks and routed packet
networks. We have introduced subset codes as appropriate
constructs for these channels. Some basic properties of subset
codes have been established, the most interesting of which is
their equivalence to the classical binary codes.
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